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The impact of advertising in a duopoly model
Lambert Schoonbeek∗ and Peter Kooreman
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Summary. We investigate the impact of advertising in a simple static differentiated
duopoly model. First, we consider the Nash equilibrium of the situation in which the
duopolistic firms compete simultaneously with two instruments, i.e. the prices and
the advertising expenditures. Second, we examine the Nash equilibrium of the situa-
tion in which the firms only compete in prices and do not advertise at all. Next, we
compare the two different Nash equilibria in order to assess the impact of advertising.
In particular, we characterize in terms of the model parameters the circumstances in
which the profits, outputs and/or prices of each firm are greater (smaller) in the Nash
equilibrium with advertising than in the Nash equilibrium without advertising. We
show that the results depend on (a) the size of the (positive) effect of advertising of a
firm on its own demand, (b) the size and nature (stimulating or adverse) of the cross-
effect of the advertising of each firm on the demand of the other firm, and (c) the size
of the autonomous demand of the firms.
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Advertising is common practice in our world. In almost every branch of industry,
firms compete by using advertisements in order to promote their products. It is there-
fore natural that economists are interested in understanding the impact of advertising
on profits, outputs and prices of firms. We recall that one of the well-known ap-
proaches to analyse the impact of advertising on the profits of a firm is in terms of a
prisoner’s dilemma game. In that case a simple duopolistic market game is consid-
ered in wich each of the two firms has two possible choices: either it advertises or it
does not advertise. Generally, it is simplyassumedthat the corresponding numerical
2× 2 profit (payoff) matrix is such that for each firm the profit is higher if both firms
do not advertise than if both firms do advertise. For recent examples, see Bierman and
Fernandez (1998, p. 11), Nicholson (1995, p. 679) and Waldman and Jensen (1997,
p. 324). We stress that in these cases the size of the relevant profits is not derived
from an explicit model.
Motivated by the latter observation, we examine in this paper the impact of advertis-
ing in a model of a static duopoly with product differentiation. In particular, we derive
and compare for all possible values of the model parameters the size of the profits,
outputs (demands) and prices of each firm in (i) the Nash equilibrium if both firms
simultaneously compete with each other in prices as well as in advertising expendi-
tures, and (ii) the Nash equilibrium if both firms only compete in prices and there is
no advertising. In this way, our analysis makes explicit in which circumstances the
profits, outputs and/or prices are higher or smaller in case (i) than in case (ii). We
notice thata priori the impact of advertising in our duopoly is not obvious. Take e.g.
the comparison of the demands of the firms in case (i) and case (ii). On the one side,
we assume in our model that advertising of a firm always has a positive effect on
its own demand. On the other side, intuitively speaking, the presence of advertising
might also lead to a higher price of this firm, which induces a negative effect on its
demand. Furthermore, the situation is even more complicated since the advertising
and price level chosen by a firm also have cross-effects on its rival’s demand, and
vice versa; recall that the firms are involved in a duopolistic game. In particular, we
remark that advertising of one firm can have a stimulating or an adverse cross-effect
on the demand of the other firm. Both kinds of effects are allowed in our analysis.
Summarizing, we conclude that a more detailed analysis is needed in order to assess
the ultimate effect on the demands of the firms. The same applies to the profits and
prices.
We further remark that our analysis can be relevant for situations in which govern-
ments (contemplate to) prohibit advertising by firms in a specific industry. For exam-
ple, in a growing number of countries firms in the cigarette industry are not allowed
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to advertise for reasons of population health. In those situations it is interesting to
know the impact of the prohibition of advertising on the profits, outputs and prices
of the firms involved; see also Von Hofmann (1987). In particular, it is interesting to
know whether it is possible that such a measure is also better, i.e. more profitable,
for the firms themselves, whereas at the same time the outputs fall. In those cases the
interests of the firms and the government coincide.
As the starting point, we take in Section 2 the duopoly model also used by Gasmi
and Vuong (1991), Gasmi et al. (1992) and Kadiyali (1996). The straightforward and
relatively simple structure of this model allows us to obtain unambiguous and in-
tuitively appealing conclusions. First, we examine the Nash equilibrium of the case
in which both firms simultaneously compete with each other in prices as well as in
advertising expenditures. Extending the analysis of the three mentioned studies, we
present a number of assumptions that are needed in order to guarantee that the Nash
equilibrium is well defined. Next, we discuss the Nash equilibrium associated with
the case in which the two duopolists do not advertise and only compete in prices. In
Section 3 we compare in detail the profits of the firms in the Nash equilibrium with
advertising and the Nash equilibrium without advertising. We present a characteriza-
tion of all possible cases. It turns out that the cases can be classified according to (a)
the size of the (positive) effect of advertising of a firm on its own demand, (b) the size
and kind of the cross-effects of advertising on the rival’s demand, and (c) the size of
the autonomous demand of the firms (i.e. the constant term in the demand functions
of the firms). Section 4 briefly discusses the comparison of the outputs and prices of
the firms in the two Nash equilibria. We end up in Section 5.
We remark that the model used in this paper is a static game, i.e. no time is involved.
Of course, one could also wish to take into account intertemporal effects of adver-
tising. To do that, one could specify a two-period game in which the firms choose
their advertising expenditures in the first period and subsequently choose their prices
in the second period, cf. Schmalensee (1983). However, many studies in marketing
have found that advertising effects upon demand depreciate very rapidly, see e.g.
Clarke (1976) and Lilien, Kotler and Moorthy (1992, chapter 6) for a general discus-
sion of this point. Kadiyali (1996, p. 455) also observes that many studies have found
no “carry-over” effects of advertising beyond one quarter for nondurables. Therefore,
our static formulation seems to be appropriate.
To conclude, we remark that related but different theoretical research also has inves-
tigated advertising and price decisions of firms. We mention a number of the seminal
studies. First, Bagwell and Ramey (1994a,b) present models in which advertising di-
rects uninformed consumers to the firms that offer better deals, i.e. lower prices. They
show that the case in which the firms advertise is preferable in terms of social welfare
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to the case in which they do not advertise. Second, Bagwell and Ramey (1988, 1990)
analyse signalling games in which an incumbent firm can signal with its advertising
and its price to deter or accomodate entry of a potential entrant who is uncertain about
the costs or demand conditions in the market. Third, Milgrom and Roberts (1986) ex-
amine signaling games in which firms use advertising and prices to signal product
quality to the consumers. Important in these studies is the assumption that there is
some kind of asymmetric information present in the model. We do not make such
an assumption in the present paper, however. For comprehensive reference works on
marketing, see Eliashberg and Lilien (1993) and Lilien, Kotler and Moorthy (1992).
2. The duopoly model
We consider a duopoly with the demand functions






j , i, j = 1, 2 (j 6= i), (1)
whereqi , pi andAi represent, respectively, the output, price and advertising expen-
ditures of firmi, andpj is the price of firmj . The parameterγi0 denotes the au-
tonomous demand of firmi. We remark that (1) involves the reasonable assumptions
that the demand is linear in prices – which is common in the literature – and that the
marginal effect of extra advertising is positive but with a diminishing rate. More gen-
erally, one might possibly prefer to use terms of the typeAδii andA
δj
j in the demand
function, with 0< δi, δj < 1. However, the choiceδi = δj = 12 is convenient for
expositional purposes.
The cost function of firmi is given by
Ci(qi) = ciqi, i = 1, 2. (2)
The parameters of (1) and (2) satisfy the following assumption:
Assumption 1 We have:
(a) αii < 0, αij > 0, γi0 > 0, γii > 0, ci > 0, i, j = 1, 2 (j 6= i)
(b) α11α22 − α12α21 > 0
(c) αii + 14γ 2ii < 0, i = 1, 2.
The interpretation of (a) of Assumption 1 is straightforward. Note thatαij > 0 means
that the goods of both firms are substitutes. Intuitively speaking, (b) means that taken
together the ‘own-price’ effects dominate the ‘cross-price’ effects, i.e. the product
α11α22 of the ‘own-price’ coefficients is larger than the productα12α21 of the ‘cross-
price’ coefficients. The meaning of (c) will be discussed shortly. Here we only no-
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tice that given the value ofαii, (c) implies an upperbound on the size of the ‘own-
advertising’ coefficientγii, i.e.γii < 2
√−αii. Remark further that we do not impose
a restriction on the sign of the coefficients of the cross-effects of advertising. Adver-
tising of firm j (j 6= i) has a stimulating effect on the demand of firmi if γij > 0,
and an adverse effect ifγij < 0. In general, the firms might be able to choose the
nature of their advertising, but that possibility is disregarded here.
Using (1) and (2) we write the profit function of firmi as







j ) − Ai, i, j = 1, 2 (j 6= i). (3)
We consider the duopoly as a noncooperative game in whichpi andAi are the deci-
sion variables of firmi andπi(pi, pj , Ai, Aj ) is its payoff function (i = 1, 2). The
first-order conditions associated with an interior optimum of the profit-maximization
problem of firmi read
∂πi
∂pi






j − αiici = 0 (4)
∂πi
∂Ai
= 12(pi − ci)γiiA−
1
2
i − 1 = 0. (5)
Notice that (5) requires thatpi −ci > 0. Further, (5) can be rewritten asAi = Ai(pi).
The second-order conditions must hold as well, i.e. we require that in the optimum the
Hessian ofπi(pi, pj , Ai, Aj ) as a function ofpi andAi is a negative definite matrix.
It can be verified by using (5) that this requires thatαii < 0 andαii + 14γ 2ii < 0.
These two inequalities are guaranteed by, respectively, (a) and (c) of Assumption 1.
We finally observe that (5) implies that in the optimum the ratio of the advertising
expenditures to the total revenues equals the product of the price-cost margin with
the elasticity of demand with respect to advertising expenditures. This relates our
analysis to the well-known Dorfman-Steiner condition, see e.g. Waterson (1984, pp.
128-134).






2) denote an (interior) Nash equilibrium of the game. The as-
sociated output and profit level of firmi = 1, 2 are denoted byq∗i = qi(p∗i , p∗j , A∗i , A∗j )
andπ∗i = πi(p∗i , p∗j , A∗i , A∗j ). Using the set of first-order conditions of both firms it
follows that we must haveR(p∗ − c) = d, wherep∗ = (p∗1, p∗2)′, c = (c1, c2)′,
d = (d1, d2)′ with di = −γi0 − αiici − αij cj (i, j = 1, 2; j 6= i), and matrix
R = (rij ) is given by
R =
(
2α11 + 12γ 211 α12 + 12γ12γ22
α21 + 12γ21γ11 2α22 + 12γ 222
)
. (6)
Part (c) of Assumption 1 means that the diagonal elements ofR are negative.
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In order to guarantee that the Nash equilibrium is well defined – i.e.p∗i − ci > 0,
q∗i > 0, andπ
∗
i > 0 for i = 1, 2 – we present the following assumption regarding the
signs of the elements of vectord, the determinant of matrixR and the off-diagonal
elements ofR:
Assumption 2 We have:
(a) γi0 + αiici + αij cj > 0, i, j = 1, 2 (j 6= i)
(b) det(R) = (2α11 + 12γ 211)(2α22 + 12γ 222) − (α12 + 12γ12γ22)(α21 + 12γ21γ11) > 0
(c) αij + 12γij γjj > 0, i, j = 1, 2 (j 6= i).
Part (a) of Assumption 2 states the reasonable requirement that the demand of each
firm is positive if both firms set their prices equal to their own marginal cost (i.e.
the lowest possible value) and moreover both firms do not advertise. Note that part
(a) means thatd1 < 0 andd2 < 0. Next, (b) of Assumption 2 implies thatR is
a nonsingular matrix. As a resultp∗ − c = R−1d. Using (c) of Assumption 1 and
(b) and (c) of Assumption 2 it follows that the elements of matrixR−1 are negative.
Together with (a) of Assumption 2, this guarantees thatp∗i − ci > 0. The output level
q∗i equals
q∗i = γi0 + αiip∗i + αijp∗j + γii(A∗i )
1
2 + γij (A∗j )
1
2
= −(p∗i − ci)αii , (7)
where the last equality follows from (4). We see thatq∗i > 0 becausep
∗
i − ci > 0.
The profit levelπ∗i reads
π∗i = (p∗i − ci)
(
γi0 + αiip∗i + αijp∗j + γii(A∗i )
1





= (p∗i − ci)(−αiip∗i + αiici) − A∗i
= −(p∗i − ci)2(αii + 14γ 2ii), (8)
where the second and third equality follow, respectively, from (4) and (5). Part (c) of
Assumption 1 implies thatπ∗i > 0.
In order to discuss (b) and (c) of Assumption 2 somewhat further, examine the com-
parative statics effects of a (marginal) increase in the autonomous demandγi0 for
goodi on the pricesp∗i andp
∗
j , i, j = 1, 2 (j 6= i). It follows from p∗ − c = R−1d
that∂p∗i /∂γi0 = −rjj / det(R) and∂p∗j /∂γi0 = −rji/ det(R). In the comparative stat-
ics literature it is standard to suppose now thatR is a stable matrix. This is tantamount
to assuming that a naive dynamic adjustment process of the prices that results as a
consequence of the (marginal) change inγi0 is locally stable around the Nash equi-
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librium, see e.g. Varian (1992, pp. 288, 289).1 We recall that matrixR is stable if and
only if (i) its trace is negative and (ii) its determinant is positive. Remark that (i) is
guaranteed by (c) of Assumption 1 and (ii) corresponds to (b) of Assumption 2. Since
rjj < 0, we conclude that∂p∗i /∂γi0 > 0. In turn, (c) of Assumption 2 implies that
∂p∗j /∂γi0 < 0. Thus, the comparative statics effects have the ‘normal’ signs. Finally,
we note that (c) of Assumption 2 implies thatγij > −2αij /γjj , i.e. it gives a (nega-
tive) lowerbound on the size of the coefficientγij of the cross-effect of advertising,
given the values ofαij andγjj .
Proceeding, let us turn now to the situation in which the two firms do not make any
advertisements, i.e. the advertising expenditures are restricted toA1 = A2 = 0. One
can verify that the price vectorp0 = (p01, p02)′, say, in the (interior) Nash equilibrium
corresponding to this situation must satisfy the first-order conditionsR0(p0−c) = d,







Further, analogously to (7) and (8), the corresponding output levelq0i of firm i can be
written as
q0i = −(p0i − ci)αii, (10)
and the corresponding profit levelπ0i = πi(p0i , p0j , 0, 0) of firm i equals
π0i = −(p0i − ci)2αii . (11)
We remark that the Assumptions 1 and 2 also guarantee that this Nash equilibrium is
well defined, i.e.p0i − ci > 0, q0i > 0 andπ0i > 0 for i = 1, 2. Also notice that all
elements of matrixR−10 in p
0 − c = R−10 d are negative.
3. The profits in the Nash equilibria












advertising, i.e. we compareπ∗i andπ
0
i , i = 1, 2.
First, we recall from the previous section thatp∗ − c = R−1d andp0 − c = R−10 d.
Next, it follows from (8) and (11) thatπ0i > π
∗
i if and only if (p
0
i − ci)2 > (1 +
1 This assumption is known as the correspondence principle of Samuelson (1947); see Gandolfo
(1997, chapter 20) for a comprehensive modern discussion of the principle. For a critical account of




)(p∗i − ci)2, i = 1, 2. Now, define matrixT = (tij ) as
T = R−10 − SR−1, (12)





1 + γ 2114α11 0
0
√
1 + γ 2224α22

 . (13)
Notice that as a result of (c) of Assumption 1, the diagonal elements of matrixS
satisfy 0< sii < 1, i = 1, 2. Combining results, we obtain that
π∗i ≷ π0i ⇔ tiidi + tij dj ≶ 0, i, j = 1, 2 (j 6= i). (14)
Recall thatdi < 0, i = 1, 2. Further, recalling that the elements ofR−10 andSR−1
are negative, we conclude that the elements ofT may be positive, negative or equal
to zero. Note that the elements ofT do not depend on the parametersγi0, i = 1, 2.
For a given value ofi, we will analyse now the signs oftii and tij as a function of
the advertising cross-effect coefficientsγij andγji , i.e. we writetii = tii (γij , γji) and
tij = tij (γij , γji). Remark that given the values ofα11, α22, α12, α21, γ11 andγ22, the
values ofγij andγji are constrained by (b) and (c) of Assumption 2. In particular,γij
andγji must lie in a feasible region0i , say, of the(γij , γji)-plane, where0i consists
of all points (γij , γji) that simultaneously satisfy the following three requirements:
(i) they lie above a lower boundary given by the lineγji = −2αji/γii, (ii) they lie
to the right of a left boundary given by the lineγij = −2αij /γjj , and (iii) they lie
below and to the left of an upper-right boundary given by the points(γij , γji) such
that det(R) = 0. The three boundaries themselves are not part of0i . The slope of the










= −γjj (αji +
1
2γjiγii)
γii(αij + 12γijγjj )
< 0. (15)
Thus, the upper-right boundary is downward sloping and has a strictly convex form
















The set of all points(γij , γji) ∈ 0i such thattii (γij , γji) = t̄ii , where t̄ii is some
constant, is called a level curve oftii (γij , γji). Analogously,tij (γij , γji) = t̄ij defines
a level curve oftij (γij , γji). The following lemma which is proved in the Appendix,
presents an overview with respect to the possible signs oftii (γij , γji) andtij (γij , γji)
on0i.
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Lemma 3.1 Take the duopoly model with the Assumptions 1 and 2 and matrix
T of (12). Consider level curves oftii (γij , γji) and tij (γij , γji) in 0i , with i, j =
1, 2 (j 6= i). The following holds:
(a) Each level curve oftii (γij , γji) is downward sloping and strictly convex to-
wards the point(−2αij /γjj ,−2αji/γii). To the right (resp. left) of the level
















(b) There are two cases with respect to the level curves oftii (γij , γji). First, if
4α11α22(1 − sii) ≥ α12α21, thentii (γij , γji) > 0 everywhere on0i . Second,
if 4α11α22(1 − sii) < α12α21, then0i contains a level curvetii (γij , γji) = 0.
As a result, in this casetii (γij , γji) ≷ 0 if and only ifγij ≷ γ̂ij (γji), where
given the value ofγji, γ̂ij (γji) is the unique solution oftii (γ̂ij (γji), γji) = 0.
Further, γ̂ij (γji) < 0 for all γji ≥ 0.
(c) Each level curve oftij (γij , γji) is downward sloping and strictly convex to-
wards the point(−2αij /γjj ,−2αji/γii). To the right (resp. left) of the level









(d) 0i contains a level curvetij (γij , γji) = 0. As a result,tij (γij , γji) ≷ 0 if
and only ifγij ≷ γ̃ij (γji), where given the value ofγji, γ̃ij (γji) is the unique
solution oftij (γ̃ij (γji), γji) = 0. Further,γ̃ij (γji) < 0 for all γji ≥ 0. Finally,
there exists on the lower boundary of0i a point (γ 0ij ,−2αji/γii) with γ 0ij >
−2αij /γjj such thattij (γ 0ij ,−2αji/γii) = 0. There holdsγ 0ij ≶ 0 if and only
if 4α11α22(1 − siis2jj ) ≷ α12α21.
(e) Level curves oftij (γij , γji) are steeper than level curves oftii (γij , γji), i.e. in
each(γij , γji) ∈ 0i the slope of the corresponding level curve oftij (γij , γji)
is in absolute value greater than the slope of the corresponding level curve of
tii (γij , γji).
(f) If 4α11α22(1 − sii) < α12α21, then the level curvestii(γij , γji) = 0 and
tij (γij , γji) = 0 have a unique point of intersection(γ sij , γ sji) ∈ 0i , say, with
γ sij < 0 andγ
s
ji < 0.
In Figure 3.1 we illustrate Lemma 3.1 for a situation in which 4α11α22(1 − sii) <





















Figure 3.1: level curvestii = 0 andtij = 0.
According to (b) of Assumption 1 we haveα11α22 > α12α21, and thus certainly
4α11α22 > α12α21. Using (13), this shows that the case 4α11α22(1 − sii) < α12α21,
mentioned in (b) of Lemma 3.1, can occur only if, given the values ofα11, α22, α12
andα21, the size of firmi’s ‘own-advertising’ coefficientγii is ‘small enough’. Sim-
ilarly, the case 4α11α22(1 − siis2jj ) < α12α21, mentioned in (d) of Lemma 3.1, can
occur only if, given the values ofα11, α22, α12, α21 andγjj , the size ofγii is ‘ex-
tremely small’. Note that always 4α11α22(1− sii) < 4α11α22(1− siis2jj ). We will say
below that the effect of advertising of firmi on its own demand is ‘relatively large’ if
4α11α22(1−sii ) ≥ α12α21. The effect is ‘relatively small’ if 4α11α22(1−sii ) < α12α21.
Using Lemma 3.1 we are able to present the following proposition which character-
izes in a precise way the circumstances in which the profitπ∗i of firm i in the Nash
equilibrium with advertising is greater than (resp. smaller than, or equal to) the profit
π0i in the Nash equilibrium without advertising.
Proposition 3.1 Take the duopoly model with the Assumptions 1 and 2 and matrix
T defined in (12). Fori, j = 1, 2 (j 6= i), let γ̂ij (γji), γ̃ij (γji) and (γ sij , γ sji) be as
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defined in, respectively, (b), (d) and (f) of Lemma 3.1. Finally, define
γ̂i0 = (tij /tii )dj − αiici − αij cj .
Then the following cases can be distinguished for(γij , γji) ∈ 0i :
Case (i): Let4α11α22(1 − sii) ≥ α12α21. Then we have for each value ofγji:
(a) If γij < γ̃ij (γji), thenπ∗i ≷ π0i if and only ifγi0 ≷ γ̂i0.
(b) If γij ≥ γ̃ij (γji), thenπ∗i > π0i .
Case (ii): Let4α11α22(1 − sii) < α12α21.
- subcase (iia): Letγji < γ sji. Thenγ̃ij (γji) < γ̂ij (γji), and we have:
(c) If γij ≤ γ̃ij (γji), thenπ∗i < π0i .
(d) If γ̃ij (γji) < γij < γ̂ij (γji), thenπ∗i ≷ π0i if and only ifγi0 ≶ γ̂i0.
(e) If γ̂ij (γji) ≤ γij , thenπ∗i > π0i .
- subcase (iib): Letγji = γ sji. Thenγ̃ij (γji) = γ̂ij (γji), and we have:
(f) If γij < γ̃ij (γji), thenπ∗i < π
0
i .
(g) If γij = γ̃ij (γji), thenπ∗i = π0i .
(h) If γ̃ij (γji) < γij , thenπ∗i > π
0
i .
- subcase (iic): Letγji > γ sji. Thenγ̂ij (γji) < γ̃ij (γji), and we have:
(i) If γij ≤ γ̂ij (γji), thenπ∗i < π0i .
(j) If γ̂ij (γji) < γij < γ̃ij (γji), thenπ∗i ≷ π0i if and only ifγi0 ≷ γ̂i0.
(k) If γ̃ij (γji) ≤ γij , thenπ∗i > π0i .
PROOF. We only give the proof of parts (a) and (b). All other parts can be proved
similarly. First, recall (14) and the fact thatdi < 0, i = 1, 2. Next, let 4α11α22(1 −
sii) ≥ α12α21. In that case we know from (b) of Lemma 3.1 that alwaystii (γij , γji) >
0. Furthermore, in caseγij ≥ γ̃ij (γji), it follows that tij (γij , γji) ≥ 0, and we con-
clude from (14) thatπ∗i > π
0
i , which proves (b) of the proposition. On the other side,
if γij < γ̃ij (γji), thentij (γij , γji) < 0, and we conclude from (14) thatπ∗i ≷ π0i if
and only ifγi0 ≷ γ̂i0, which establishes (a) of the proposition. 2
Discussing Proposition 3.1 it is useful to give corollaries for the two interesting sym-
metric cases in which advertising of both firms has either a stimulating or an adverse
cross-effect on the demand of its rival. We can derive in a similar way a corollary for
the case in which advertising of firmj , say, has a stimulating cross-effect on firmi,
whereas advertising of firmi has an adverse cross-effect on firmj . Details of this
asymmetric case are left to the reader. First, we see that the profits are greatest in
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the Nash equilibrium with advertising if advertising of both firms has a stimulating
cross-effect, i.e.
Corollary 3.1 Take the duopoly model with the Assumptions 1 and 2. Consider the
case in which advertising of both firms has a stimulating cross-effect on the demand
of the other firm. Thenπ∗i > π
0
i , for i = 1, 2.
PROOF. We know from (b) and (d) of Lemma 3.1 thatγ̃ij (γji) < 0 andγ̂ij (γji) <
0 for all γji > 0. The proof then follows from (b), (e), (h) and (k) of Proposition 3.1.
2
Next, we remark that the terminology used in Corollary 3.2 corresponds in the ob-
vious way to the relevant cases distinguished in Proposition 3.1. In particular, we
mention that parts (1) and (2) of Corollary 3.2 correspond to, respectively, (a) and (b)
of Proposition 3.1. Parts (3) to (8) correspond to, respectively, (c), (d), (e), (i), (j) and
(k) of the proposition.
Corollary 3.2 Take the duopoly model with the Assumptions 1 and 2. Consider
the case in which advertising of both firms has an adverse cross-effect on the demand
of the other firm. We then can identify the following typical situations regardingπ∗i
andπ0i , with i, j = 1, 2 (j 6= i):
• Suppose that the effect of the advertising of firmi on its own demand is relatively
large. Then:
(1) If advertising of firmj has a relatively strongly adverse cross-effect on firm
i’s demand, thenπ∗i is greater thanπ
0
i if and only if the autonomous demand
of firm i is relatively large.
(2) If advertising of firmj has a relatively weakly adverse cross-effect on firmi’s
demand, thenπ∗i is greater thanπ
0
i .
• Suppose that the effect of the advertising of firmi on its own demand is relatively
small. Then:
(3) If advertising of firmi has a relatively strongly adverse cross-effect on firm
j ’s demand and advertising of firmj has a relatively strongly adverse cross-
effect on firmi’s demand, thenπ∗i is smaller thanπ
0
i .
(4) If advertising of firmi has a relatively strongly adverse cross-effect on firm
j ’s demand and advertising of firmj has a relatively moderately adverse
cross-effect on firmi’s demand, thenπ∗i is greater thanπ
0
i if and only if the
autonomous demand of firmi is relatively small.
(5) If advertising of firmi has a relatively strongly adverse cross-effect on firmj ’s
demand and advertising of firmj has a relatively weakly adverse cross-effect
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on firm i’s demand, thenπ∗i is greater thanπ
0
i .
(6) If advertising of firmi has a relatively weakly adverse cross-effect on firmj ’s
demand and advertising of firmj has a relatively strongly adverse cross-effect
on firm i’s demand, thenπ∗i is smaller thanπ
0
i .
(7) If advertising of firmi has a relatively weakly adverse cross-effect on firm
j ’s demand and advertising of firmj has a relatively moderately adverse
cross-effect on firmi’s demand, thenπ∗i is greater thanπ
0
i if and only if the
autonomous demand of firmi is relatively large.
(8) If advertising of firmi has a relatively weakly adverse cross-effect on firmj ’s
demand and advertising of firmj has a relatively weakly adverse effect on
firm i’s demand, thenπ∗i is greater thanπ
0
i .
Clearly, Corollary 3.2 lends an intuitive explanation of the determinants of the rela-
tive size ofπ∗i andπ
0
i . For instance, comparing parts (2) and (1), we see that if the
advertising of firmj becomes more adverse with respect to firmi’s demand, then
an additional condition must hold in order to have thatπ∗i is greater thanπ
0
i , i.e. the
autonomous demand of firmi must be relatively large (γi0 > γ̂i0). In a similar way,
we can point out the effect if the advertising of firmj becomes more adverse with
respect to firmi’s demand, by comparing the parts (5), (4) and (3), or the parts (8),
(7) and (6).
Viewed from a different angle, we can say that part (2) of Corollary 3.2 describes the
typical ‘extreme’ case in which advertising is mostly advantageous for firmi, i.e. the
(positive) effect of advertising of firmi on its own demand is relatively large and,
in addition, advertising of firmj has only a relatively weakly adverse cross-effect
on firm i’s demand. So, it is clear thatπ∗i > π
0
i in this case. On the other hand,
parts (3) and (6) decribe the opposite ‘extreme’ cases in which advertising is mostly
disadvantageous for firmi, because the (positive) effect of advertising of firmi on
its own demand is now only relatively small and, moreover, advertising of firmj has
a relatively strongly adverse cross-effect on firmi’s demand. Again, it is clear that
now π∗i < π
0
i . Note that the parts (2), (3) and (6) do not depend on the size of the
autonomous demand of firmi. Further, the other parts of the corollary capture the
‘intermediate’ situations which lie between these ‘extreme’ ones.
We further notice the difference between the parts (4) and (7) of Corollary 3.2. Ap-
parantly, there is a trade-off with respect to the determinants of the caseπ∗i > π
0
i :
i.e. ceteris paribuswe haveπ∗i > π
0
i if either advertising of firmi has a relatively
stronglyadverse cross-effect on firmj ’s demand and the autonomous demand of firm
i is relativelysmall(part (4)), or advertising of firmi has a relativelyweaklyadverse
cross-effect on firmj ’s demand and the autonomous demand of firmi is relatively
13
large (part (7)).
Concluding this section, we remark that Proposition 3.1 gives us a complete charac-
terization of all possible situations regarding the size of the profits of firmi in the
two Nash equilibria. Broadly speaking, we can say that the comparison of the profit
levels is relatively simple if the effect of advertising of firmi on its own demand is
relatively large, see case (i) of Proposition 3.1. Namely, in that case only two differ-
ent situations are possible, i.e. parts (a) and (b) of the proposition. On the other side,
if the effect of advertising of firmi on its own demand is relatively small (see case
(ii) of Proposition 3.1), then the comparison of the profits is much more tedious, as is
reflected in the larger number of possible situations, i.e parts (c) up to and including
(k) of the proposition. From a theoretical point of view, we have to take into account
the possible occurrence of all different situations. Clearly, empirical work is needed
in order to assess which one is relevant in a specific practical application.
4. The outputs and prices in the Nash equilibria
In this section we briefly discuss the comparison of the outputs and prices of firmi





i , for i = 1, 2. Recallp∗ − c = R−1d, p0 − c = R−10 d, and (7) and (10).
Defining matrixU = (uij ) as
U = R−10 − R−1 (17)
we obtain
q∗i ≷ q0i ⇔ p∗i ≷ p0i ⇔ uiidi + uij dj ≶ 0, i, j = 1, 2 (j 6= i). (18)
Clearly, (18) is the counterpart of (14). The only difference between the matricesT
andU is that in the definition of matrixU the matrixS is replaced by an identity
matrix. In fact, the comparison of the outputs and prices in the two Nash equilibria
can be carried out along exactly the same lines as the comparison of the profits in the
previous section.
In particular, let us define in0i level curvesuii(γij , γji) = ūii anduij (γij , γji) = ūij .
It can be verified that in each point(γij , γji) ∈ 0i we havetii (γij , γji) < uii(γij , γji)
and tij (γij , γji) < uij (γij , γji). Furthermore, in each(γij , γji) ∈ 0i the slopes of
the corresponding level curves ofuii(γij , γji) andtii (γij , γji) are identical. The same
applies to the slopes of the level curves ofuij (γij , γji) and tij (γij , γji). Using this,
we easily obtain the following counterpart of Lemma 3.1.
Lemma 4.1 Take the duopoly model with the Assumptions 1 and 2, matrixT
of (12) and matrixU of (17). Consider level curves ofuii(γij , γji) anduij (γij , γji)
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in 0i , with i, j = 1, 2 (j 6= i). The following holds:
(a) Each level curveuii(γij , γji) = ūii coincides with some level curve
tii (γij , γji) = t̄ii , wheret̄ii < ūii . To the right (resp. left) of the level curve
uii(γij , γji) = ūii we haveuii(γij , γji) > ūii (resp.< ūii).
(b) There are two cases with respect to the level curves ofuii(γij , γji). First, if
4α11α22(1 − s2ii) ≥ α12α21, thenuii(γij , γji) > 0 everywhere on0i. Second,
if 4α11α22(1 − s2ii ) < α12α21, then0i contains a level curveuii(γij , γji) = 0.
As a result, in this caseuii(γij , γji) ≷ 0 if and only ifγij ≷ γ̄ij (γji), where
given the value ofγji, γ̄ij (γji) is the unique solution ofuii(γ̄ij (γji), γji) = 0.
Further, γ̄ij (γji) < 0 for all γji ≥ 0.
(c) Each level curveuij (γij , γji) = ūij coincides with some level curve
tij (γij , γji) = t̄ij , wheret̄ij < ūij . To the right (resp. left) of the level curve
uij (γij , γji) = ūij we haveuij (γij , γji) > ūij (resp.< ūij ).
(d) 0i contains a level curveuij (γij , γji) = 0. As a result,uij (γij , γji) ≷ 0 if
and only ifγij ≷ ¯̄γ ij (γji), where given the value ofγji, ¯̄γ ij (γji) is the unique
solution ofuij ( ¯̄γ ij (γji), γji) = 0. Further, ¯̄γ ij (γji) < 0 for all γji ≥ 0.
Finally, there exists on the lower boundary of0i a point(γ 1ij ,−2αji/γii) with
γ 1ij > −2αij /γjj such thatuij (γ 1ij ,−2αji/γii) = 0. There holdsγ 1ij ≶ 0 if
and only if4α11α22(1 − s2ii s2jj ) ≷ α12α21.
(e) If 4α11α22(1 − s2ii ) < α12α21, then the level curvesuii(γij , γji) = 0 and
uij (γij , γji) = 0 have a unique point of intersection(γ ssij , γ ssji ) ∈ 0i , say, with
γ ssij < 0 andγ
ss
ji < 0.
We make now three observations. First, part (a) of Lemma 4.1 implies that a level
curve ofuii(γij , γji) which corresponds to a certain constant value is located below
and to the left of the level curve oftii (γij , γji) pertaining to the same constant value.
Part (c) means that the same applies to the level curves ofuij (γij , γji) andtij (γij , γji).
Hence, the level curveuii(γij , γji) = 0 (in case it lies within0i) and the level curve
uij (γij , γji) = 0 are located below and to the left of the level curvestii (γij , γji) = 0
and tij (γij , γji) = 0, respectively. As a result, for allγji there holdsγ̄ij (γji) <
γ̂ij (γji) and ¯̄γ ij (γji) < γ̃ij (γji).
Second, using Lemma 4.1, we can give in the obvious way results completely similar





i . For instance, as the counterpart of (b) of Proposition 3.1 we have
the following. Let 4α11α22(1 − s2ii) ≥ α12α21. Then we have for each value ofγji: if
γij ≥ ¯̄γ ij (γji), thenq∗i > q0i andp∗i > p0i .
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Third, using the first two observations, and recalling our discussion of advertising
bans in Section 1, we observe that there are situations with−2αij /γjj < γij < 0
and−2αji/γii < γji < 0 such thatq∗i > q0i andp∗i > p0i , but π∗i < π0i . In these
situations the output and price of firmi are smallest in the Nash equilibrium without
advertising. However, the profits are greatest in this Nash equilibrium, i.e. it is in the
interest of firmi if the firms (have to) stop with advertising. The reason is that the
reduction in the revenues of firmi is more than compensated by the disappearance
of its advertising costs. To illustrate the occurrence of such situations, take the case
where 4α11α22(1 − sii) ≥ α12α21, i.e. the effect of advertising of firmi on its own
demand is relatively large. Corresponding to this case, we can draw Figure 4.1 (note
that in this casetii (γij , γji) > 0 anduii(γij , γji) > 0 everywhere in0i). Consider
now a point in the interior of the shaded regionN . We then haveγij ≥ ¯̄γ ij (γji),






i (cf. our second observation above). Further, we
also haveγij < γ̃ij (γji), which implies thatπ∗i < π
0
i if and only if γi0 < γ̂i0, i.e.
if and only if the autonomous demand of firmi is relatively small (cf. part (a) of
Proposition 3.1). Intuitively speaking, the condition that the autonomous demand of
firm i must be relatively small can be understood by noting that,ceteris paribus, in
that case a decrease in the price of firmi from p∗i to p
0
i leads to a relatively small
reduction in the revenues of firmi.
5. Conclusion
This paper has analysed the impact of advertising in a duopoly model by comparing
the two situations in which the firms either simultaneously compete in prices as well
as in advertising, or do not advertise at all and only compete in prices. We presented a
proposition that characterizes in terms of a small set of factors the relative size of the
profit of firm i = 1, 2 in the two corresponding Nash equilibria. The relevant factors
are (a) the size of the (positive) effect of advertising of firmi on its own demand, (b)
the size and nature (stimulating or adverse) of the cross-effect of the advertising of
each firm on the demand of the other firm, and (c) the size of the autonomous demand
of firm i.
Interpreting, we focused on the two symmetric cases in which advertising of both
firms has either a stimulating or an adverse cross-adverse effect on the demand of
its rival. For the case with stimulating cross-effects, the profit of firmi is highest in
the Nash equilibrium with advertising. For the case with adverse cross-effects, we
identified two opposite ‘extreme’ situations. In the first one, the effect of advertising
of firm i on its own demand is relatively large and, in addition, advertising of firm
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of firm i is greatest in the Nash equilibrium with advertising. In the second one, the
effect of advertising of firmi on its own demand is relatively small and, moreover,
advertising of firmj 6= i has a relatively strongly adverse effect on firmi’s demand.
Then the profit of firmi is greatest in the Nash equilibrium without advertising. Our
results further show that in the situations which lie between these ‘extreme’ ones,
the relative size of the profit of firmi depends on a combination of the factors (a),
(b) and/or (c) mentioned above. We have seen that qualitatively identical conclusions
hold with respect to the relative size of the outputs and prices of each firm in the two
Nash equilibria. Concluding, we remark that our theoretical analysis has provided
us with a full characterization of all possible situations. Clearly, empirical work is
needed in order to assess which situation is relevant in specific practical applications.
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In this appendix we provide the proof of Lemma 3.1 and give some details with re-
spect to the elements of the matrixU of (17).
Straightforward manipulations show that the elements of matrixT of (12) are given
by
tii = 2αjjdet(R0) −
[




4α11α22 − α12α21 −[
sii(2αjj + 12γ 2jj )
4α11α22s211s
2




tij = − αijdet(R0) +
[




4α11α22 − α12α21 +[
sii(αij + 12γij γjj )
4α11α22s211s
2
22 − (α12 + 12γ12γ22)(α21 + 12γ21γ11)
]
, (A.2)
wherei, j = 1, 2 (j 6= i).
• Proof of Lemma 3.1:
















jj )γii(αij + 12γij γjj )
(det(R))2
> 0.











= −γjj (αji +
1
2γjiγii)
γii(αij + 12γij γjj )
< 0. (A.3)
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All statements of (a) directly follow from these three equations.
- (b) Examining points on the left boundary and lower boundary of0i , we obtain for
all γji andγij that
tii (−2αij
γjj




4α11α22 − α12α21 −
[






Remark that̄tii is a constant which is independent ofγij andγji. It can be verified
that t̄ii ≷ 0 if and only if 4α11α22(1− sii) ≷ α12α21. Next, we conclude that if̄tii ≥ 0,
thentii (γij , γji) > 0 everywhere on0i . On the contrary, if̄tii < 0, then a level curve
tii (γij , γji) = 0 must lie in0i .
The statement thattii(γij , γji) ≷ 0 if and only if γij ≷ γ̂ij (γji), whereγ̂ij (γji) is
the unique solution oftii(γ̂ij (γji), γji) = 0, follows from (a) of the lemma. Finally,
it can be verified that there exists a valueγ ′ji with −2αji/γii < γ ′ji < 0, such that
γ̂ij (γji) ≶ 0 if and only ifγji ≷ γ ′ji. This implies thatγ̂ij (γji) < 0 for all γji ≥ 0.
- (c) Observe that in all points of0i we have
∂tij
∂γij











2siiγii(αij + 12γijγjj )2
(det(R))2
> 0.
















ii)(αjj + 14γ 2jj )
γii(αij + 12γijγjj )2
< 0. (A.4)
The statements of (c) all follow directly from these three equations.
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- (d) Observe that in all points on the left boundary of0i , i.e. for allγji , there holds
tij (−2αij
γjj
, γji) = − αij4α11α22 − α12α21 < 0,




4α11α22 − α12α21 +





It can be verified from (A.5) that there exists a valueγ 0ij > −2αij /γjj such that
tij (γ
0
ij ,−2αji/γii) = 0. This implies that0i contains a level curvetij (γij , γji) = 0
which, if extended on the lower boundary of0i , passes through the point(γ 0ij ,−2αji/γii).
Substitutingγ 0ij in (A.5), we can derive thatγ
0
ij ≶ 0 if and only if 4α11α22(1−siis2jj ) ≷
α12α21.
The statement thattij (γij , γji) ≷ 0 if and only ifγij ≷ γ̃ij (γji), whereγ̃ij (γji) is the
unique solution oftij (γ̃ij (γji), γji) = 0, follows from (a) of the lemma. Further, two
possible cases might occur. First, ifγ 0ij ≤ 0, thenγ̃ij (γji) < 0 for all feasible values of
γji. Second, ifγ 0ij > 0, then there exists a valueγ
′′
ji with −2αji/γii < γ ′′ji < 0, such
thatγ̃ij (γji) ≶ 0 if and only ifγji ≷ γ ′′ji . In both cases it follows that̃γij (γji) < 0 for
all γji ≥ 0.
















(α12 + 12γ12γ22)(α21 + 12γ21γ11)
> 1.
This shows that the level curves oftij (γij , γji) are steeper than the level curves of
tii (γij , γji).
- (f) It follows from (b) and (e) of this lemma that in case 4α11α22(1 − sii) < α12α21,
there exists in0i a unique point of intersection(γ sij , γ
s
ji), say, of the level curves
tii (γij , γji) = 0 andtij (γij , γji) = 0. Substitutingγ sij andγ sji in (A.1) and (A.2) and
combining both resulting equations, we end up withγ sij = γjjαij /(2αjj ) < 0. If we










jj − (αij + 12(
γjjαij
2αjj
)γjj )(αji + 12γ sjiγii) = sii(4α11α22 − α12α21)s2jj .
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In turn, this implies that
4α11α22s
2
ii − αij (αji + 12γ sjiγii) = 4α11α22sii − αijαjisii .
Because 0< sii < 1, it follows from the latter thatγ sji < 0.
• In Section 4, just above Lemma 4.1., it is stated that in each point(γij , γji) ∈ 0i ,
we havetii (γij , γji) < uii(γij , γji) andtij (γij , γji) < uij (γij , γji). It is further stated
there that in each(γij , γji) ∈ 0i the slopes of the level curves ofuii(γij , γji) and
tii (γij , γji), as well as ofuij (γij , γji) and tij (γij , γji) are identical. Here we shall
give the proof of these statements.
— Straightforward manipulations show that the elements of matrixU of (17) are
given by
uii = 2αjjdet(R0) −
[




4α11α22 − α12α21 −[
2αjj + 12γ 2jj
4α11α22s211s
2




uij = − αijdet(R0) +
[




4α11α22 − α12α21 +[
αij + 12γij γjj
4α11α22s211s
2
22 − (α12 + 12γ12γ22)(α21 + 12γ21γ11)
]
, (A.7)
wherei, j = 1, 2 (j 6= i).
Comparison of (A.6) and (A.7) with (A.1) and (A.2), respectively, directly shows that
tii (γij , γji) < uii(γij , γji) andtij (γij , γji) < uij (γij , γji).
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jj )γii(αij + 12γij γjj )
(det(R))2
> 0.











= −γjj (αji +
1
2γjiγii)







where the last equality follows from (A.3). This shows that in each(γij , γji) ∈ 0i the
slopes of the level curves ofuii(γij , γji) andtii (γij , γji) are identical.
— Finally, observe that in all points of0i we have
∂uij
∂γij











2γii(αij + 12γijγjj )2
(det(R))2
> 0.















ii )(αjj + 14γ 2jj )







where the last equality follows from (A.4). This shows that in each(γij , γji) ∈ 0i the
slopes of the level curves ofuij (γij , γji) andtij (γij , γji) are identical.
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